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Abstract. The data base of technological accidents and dis-
asters that have occurred in Russia has been created. More
than 13000 information units have been collected and an-
alyzed. The proportion of accidents triggered by natural
events (natural-technological accidents or NTA) in the total
number of technological accidents as well as a part of ev-
ery NTA type in the total number of NTA was estimated.
About 10 percent of all accidents registered in the data base
were caused by natural events; among some types of acci-
dents this proportion is even higher. Transmission facilities
with more than 90 percent of overhead lines are the most
vulnerable to the impact of natural hazards. The contribu-
tion of different natural hazards was evaluated. Regions with
the greatest NTA risk were revealed. The inﬂuence of natural
events on the technosphere is stronger in the South of the Eu-
ropean Russia and in the Russian Far East, which are more
exposed to hurricanes, snowstorms, rainfalls, icing and other
natural hazards producing NTA. The critical infrastructure
needs special protection and modernization in these regions.
The problem of the relationship between natural hazards and
the technosphere is very complicated and needs further in-
vestigation, especially taking the expected climate changes
into consideration.
1 Introduction
The catastrophic consequences of the 9-magnitude earth-
quake and devastating tsunami that struck the northeast coast
of Honshu Island in Japan on 11 March 2011, has become yet
another tragic conﬁrmation of the vulnerability of the tech-
nosphere and society, even such a highly developed one as
the Japanese, to the impacts of natural hazards. The disaster
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has shown once again that in addition to direct social, eco-
nomic, and environmental damage, natural catastrophes can
cause even more dire consequences because of the techno-
logical accidents and disasters triggered by them. The extent
of these consequences depends on the population density and
concentration of infrastructure and industrial facilities (espe-
ciallyhazardousobjects, suchasnuclearpowerplants, chem-
ical plants, reﬁneries, and pipelines) in disaster-affected ar-
eas.
The lesson learnt from the Japanese disaster was its syn-
ergistic nature: the earthquake’s impact increased due to the
ensuingtsunamiandmultipletechnologicalaccidentsinclud-
ing the severe accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant, ﬁres
in Chiba and Sendai reﬁneries, and others. All of these ac-
cidents were triggered simultaneously, which made coping
with each of them much more difﬁcult and intensiﬁed the
severity of their consequences. Moreover, the lifelines and
roads needed for ﬁghting the accidents were damaged by the
natural disaster. Various natural-technological accidents and
disasters have become more frequent during the last decades
in the world in general and in Russia, in particular, which
makes investigation of these accidents and disasters espe-
cially important. It is their synergistic character, which dis-
tinguishes them from either natural disasters or a single tech-
nological disasters. Increasing in number and severity of
natural-technological accidents is caused, on the one hand,
by the growing frequency and intensity of natural hazards
due to climate change, and on the other hand by the much
more complicated structure of modern technological systems
exposed to natural risk.
A natural-technological accident (disaster) is considered
in this paper as any kind of incident in the technosphere trig-
gered by any natural event. It should be mentioned that this
study deals with a broader range of technological accidents
and disasters induced by natural factors than the so-called
Natech risk assessment does. Showalter and Myers (1994),
Young et al. (2004), Steinberg and Cruz (2004), Krausmann
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al. (2004), Steinberg and Cruz (2004), Krausmann and Cruz (2008) regard Natechs as natural-
disaster-triggered spills and releases from fixed chemical installations, as well as oil and gas 
spills from pipelines. The present study includes also natural-event impacts on other critical 
infrastructures, industrial, and transport facilities causing any accidents, failures, and crashes.
The EMERCOM of Russia (the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, 
Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters) uses the concept of 
emergencies for reporting accidents in its official summaries. An emergency is considered as a 
situation   disturbing   the   current   activity   of   a   populated   region   due   to   an   abrupt 
technological/natural impact resulting in social, economic, or ecological damage, which requires 
special management efforts for its elimination. The criteria of an emergency are as follow: it is a 
situation causing four or more fatalities, injuring 10 or more people, disturbing living conditions 
of 100 or more people, or having a large damage (more than 100,000 Euro). Only accidents 
producing emergencies are reported by the Ministry. The same criteria are used in the paper.
The main purpose of this study is to find out natural triggers of technological accidents 
and disasters in Russia, to reveal their proportion among other causes of accidents, to identify a 
contribution of different natural hazards, and to trace regional differences in their manifestation.
2 Research regions
The Russian Federation (RF) is the subject of this research. Analysis was undertaken at the level 
of its main administrative units (federal regions). These units correspond to states in the USA, 
federal lands in Germany, or provinces in China. Official statistical data in Russia are usually 
published for these units, which represent the highest administrative level.
Fig. 1. Administrative division of the Russian Federation
The  Russian Federation consists now of 83 federal regions (Fig. 1), including 21 
republics (such as Karelia Republic, Komi Republic, the Republic of Dagestan, etc.), nine kraies 
or   territories   (such   as   Krasnodar   Krai/Territory,   Krasnoyarsk   Krai/Territory,   Stavropol 
Krai/Territory, etc.), 46 oblasts or regions (such as Moskovskaya Oblast’ or the Moscow Region, 
Leningradskaya Oblast’, etc.), one autonomous oblast’/autonomous region (Evreyskaya AO), 
and four autonomous okrugs/autonomous districts (such as Khanti-Mansisk AO and Chukotskii 
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Fig. 1. Administrative division of the Russian Federation.
and Cruz (2008) regard Natechs as natural-disaster-triggered
spills and releases from ﬁxed chemical installations, as well
as oil and gas spills from pipelines. The present study in-
cludes also natural-event impacts on other critical infras-
tructures, industrial and transport facilities causing any ac-
cidents, failures, and crashes.
The EMERCOM of Russia (the Ministry of the Russian
Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination
of Consequences of Natural Disasters) uses the concept of
emergencies for reporting accidents in its ofﬁcial summaries.
An emergency is considered as a situation disturbing the cur-
rent activity of a populated region due to an abrupt tech-
nological/natural impact resulting in social, economic, or
ecological damage, which requires special management ef-
forts for its elimination. The criteria of an emergency are
as follows: it is a situation causing four or more fatalities,
injuring 10 or more people, disturbing living conditions of
100 or more people, or having a large damage (more than
100000 Euro). Only accidents producing emergencies are
reported by the Ministry. The same criteria are used in this
paper.
The main purpose of this study is to ﬁnd out natural trig-
gers of technological accidents and disasters in Russia, to
reveal their proportion among other causes of accidents, to
identify the contribution of different natural hazards, and to
trace regional differences in their manifestation.
2 Research regions
The Russian Federation (RF) is the subject of this research.
Analysis was undertaken at the level of its main administra-
tive units (federal regions). These units correspond to states
in the USA, federal states in Germany, or provinces in China.
Ofﬁcial statistical data in Russia are usually published for
these units, which represent the highest administrative level.
The Russian Federation consists now of 83 federal re-
gions (Fig. 1), including 21 republics (such as Karelia Re-
public, Komi Republic, the Republic of Dagestan, etc.),
nine kraies or territories (such as Krasnodar Krai/Territory,
Krasnoyarsk Krai/Territory, Stavropol Krai/Territory, etc.),
46 oblasts or regions (such as Moskovskaya Oblast’ or
the Moscow Region, Leningradskaya Oblast’, etc.), one
autonomous oblast’/autonomous region (Evreyskaya AO),
and four autonomous okrugs/autonomous districts (such as
Khanti-Mansisk AO and Chukotskii AO). The two largest
Russian cities, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, are separate
federal regions too.
3 Methods
An electronic data base of technological accidents and dis-
asters in the Russian Federation has been created using daily
summaries of the EMERCOM of Russia, mass media news
reports, and other open sources of information such as input
data. Occurrence time and location, type of accident, number
of fatalities and injured people, the value of economic losses,
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 11, 2227–2234, 2011 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/11/2227/2011/E. G. Petrova: Natural factors of technological accidents: the case of Russia 2229
yearbook, 2009). In some Russian federal regions both indicators are even higher than 60 percent 
(Regions of Russia, 2009).
The manifestation of technical, social, and economic factors mentioned above not only 
leads to accidents, ruptures, and crashes directly, but also increases a vulnerability of the 
technosphere to natural impacts resulting in the severity and likelihood increasing of accidents 
(Petrova, 2006; Petrova, 2009). The technosphere in the RF is exposed to the influence of more 
than 30 different types of disaster-causing natural hazards (Kurbatova et al., 1997; Petrova and 
Shnyparkov, 2004). The most destructive of them are hurricanes and storm winds, rainfalls and 
snowfalls, floods, earthquakes, landslides, geocryological processes, karsts, debris flows, snow 
avalanches, temperature extremes, and ground subsidence. These hazardous natural processes 
and phenomena not only produce a variety of natural disasters by themselves.  Causing 
mechanical impacts on the infrastructure, industrial, and other facilities they thus become 
triggers for various natural-technological accidents (Petrova, 2005). In some cases, natural 
factors play a leading role in magnifying or triggering technological accidents.
The analysis of the data base revealed a proportion of accidents induced by natural events 
in the total number of technological accidents and disasters registered. It comes to about 10 
percent; among some types of technological accidents this proportion is even higher. Thus, in 
1991-2010, natural hazards and disasters have triggered more than 70 percent of all so-called 
“blackouts” (accidental losses of electric power or power outages) in the RF, about 30 percent of 
breakdowns in water- and 18 percent in heat supply systems, about 30 percent of collapses of 
buildings or other constructions, and 17 percent of water transport accidents. They also caused 
about nine percent of pipeline ruptures, about five percent of accidents with oil release, about 
four percent of railway accidents, and about three percent of air and car crashes, as well as other 
accidents with contaminant releases.
A contribution of different natural hazards to occurrences of various types of NTA was 
also evaluated using information collected (Table 1). The most part of them was triggered by 
hazardous hydrometeorological and related events. Criteria  of  hazardous weather events in 
Russia  are listed in the Table 2. In 1991-2010, 38 percent of all NTA were induced by 
windstorms and hurricanes, 20 percent – by snowfalls, snowdrifts, and snowstorms, another 20 
percent by rainfalls and floods, 10 percent by hard frost and icing, 7 percent by landslides, karsts, 
rockfalls, subsidence of ground, and other slope processes, and more than 4 percent by 
thunderstorms and lightning.
Fig. 2. Frequency of NTA triggered by strong winds (average annual number of events): 1 – less 
than 0.1; 2 – 0.1-0.2; 3 – 0.2-0.3; 4 – 0.4-0.6; 5 – more than 0.6
4
Fig. 2. Frequency of NTA triggered by strong winds (average annual number of events): 1 – less than 0.1; 2 – 0.1–0.3; 3 – 0.4–0.6; 4 – more
than 0.6.
a short description of every accident including a probable
cause, extent of damage, and environmental consequences,
as well as source of information are listed. More than 13000
information units have been collected in the data base; new
information is constantly being added to it. The criteria for
an emergency mentioned above are used for an accident to
be included in the data base.
Occurrence frequency of every technological accident
type (ﬁres and explosions; car and aircraft crashes; rail-
way accidents; power-, heat-, and water-supply breakdowns;
pipeline ruptures and other accidents with contaminant re-
leases; shipwrecks; sudden collapses of buildings or con-
structions, etc.) was statistically assessed for 1991–2010 at
the level of the Russian main administrative units using col-
lected data. For this purpose, the average annual number of
events for every accident type and each federal region was
calculated within the whole observation period. Probable
causes of accidents were analyzed; technological accidents
triggered by natural events (natural-technological accidents
or NTA) were found out and investigated. The proportion of
NTAs in the total number of technological accidents as well
as a part of every NTA type in the total number of NTAs was
estimated. A contribution of different natural hazards was
also evaluated.
Two series of digital maps were created for the Russian
federal regions using results of the statistical analyses. The
ﬁrst set of maps represents a mapping of triggers. Car-
tograms belonging to this set show regional distribution of
NTAs triggered by different groups of natural hazards (for
example, NTAs triggered by rainfall, snowfall, strong winds,
etc.). One example is shown in Fig. 2 and the resulting map
of all triggers – in Fig. 6. The second set of cartograms
(Figs. 4 and 5) demonstrates regional differences in the av-
erage annual number of various types of technological ac-
cidents mentioned above (a mapping of accident types); the
Digital maps presenting regional distribution of NTA, which were caused by various 
groups of natural hazards in 1991-2010, were created at the level of Russian federal regions. One 
example of this triggers’ mapping represents a cartogram  on the  Fig. 2. It demonstrates 
differences between federal regions in average annual number of accidents triggered by strong 
winds and hurricanes. They happen more often in the Far East of Russia as well as in some 
federal regions of the north-western, southern, and central parts of the European Russia that are 
exposed to these hazards most of all.
55
11
5,8
5,7
5,4
5,3
5
2,6 2,5 1,7 Failures of power supply 
Failures of heat and water supply 
Sudden collapses of buildings
Pipeline ruptures
Shipwrecks
Fires, explosions
Car crashes
Accidents with contaminant releases
Railway accidents
Air crashes
Fig. 3. Proportion of technological accidents triggered by natural hazards (in percent)
Fig. 4.  Frequency of “blackouts” triggered by natural hazards (average annual number of 
events): 1 – less than 0.1; 2 – 0.1-0.3; 3 – 0.4-0.6; 4 – 0.7-0.9; 5 – 1 and more
A part of every NTA type in the total number of NTA was estimated then (Fig. 3). The 
most frequent of NTA are breakdowns in electric power supply systems leading to “blackouts”; 
their proportion of all NTA listed in the data base exceeds 55 percent. The “blackouts” are 
mainly caused by broken wires (including abruption of wires by falling trees) and transmission 
tower collapses due to strong winds, cyclones, and hurricanes; snowstorms; deposition of ice, 
sleet, and snow; rainfalls, floods, and hailstones. Among other triggers of these accidents 
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Fig. 3. Proportion of technological accidents triggered by natural
hazards (in percent).
location of events caused by different natural hazards is also
shown on these maps (Fig. 5).
4 Results
About 60 percent of all emergencies are produced in the
Russian Federation by technological accidents and disas-
ters, which account for more than 90 percent of all fatali-
ties and more than 80 percent of all injured people. A to-
tal of 199 technological emergencies and 95 natural ones
were recorded in the RF in 2010 (Statistics of emergencies,
2011). The most frequent technological accidents are ﬁres
(on average, more than 500 ﬁres are registered per day) and
trafﬁc accidents. In 2010, ﬁres caused 13067 injuries and
12983 deaths (Statistics of ﬁres, 2011).
The main causes of technological accidents and disasters
in Russia are technical, social, and economic ones (Petrova,
2008), including inexpedient arrangement of potentially haz-
ardous objects within the country from the time of the former
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Table 1. Types of technological accidents triggered by natural hazards.
Natural Hurricanes, Snowfall, Rainfall, Hard frost, Thunder- Fogs, Floods Heat, Earth- Land- Subsidence of Snow
hazards cyclones, snowstorms, heavy icing, storm, mist drought quakes slides ground, avalanches
windstorms, snowdrifts, shower, ice-crusted lightning slump,
squalls sleets hailstones ground debris ﬂows
Technological accidents
Failures of power supply + + + + + + + + + +
Failures of heat supply + + + + +
Failures of water supply + + + + +
Car crashes + + + + + + +
Railway accidents + + + + + + +
Aircraft crashes + + + + + +
Shipwrecks + + + + +
Fires, explosions + +
Pipeline ruptures + + + + + + +
Sudden collapses of
buildings and
constructions
+ + + + + + +
Accidents with
contaminant releases
+ + + + +
Soviet Union; poor quality of design, building, reconstruc-
tion and use; increasing consumption of capital assets and
deterioration of infrastructure, transport, and industrial facil-
ities; as well as the “human factor” (operational error, ac-
cidentally or intentionally caused damage to some facilities,
etc.). For example, more than 40 percent of the ﬁres are the
result of human fault (careless handling of ﬁre) (Statistics of
ﬁres, 2009). Many objects of the critical infrastructure in the
RF were built in 1960–1980 and are nowadays beyond their
service life (Petrova, 2011). Thus, the coefﬁcient of wear
of capital assets exceeds 50 percent in enterprises producing
and distributing electric power, gas, heat, and drinking wa-
ter; and 55 percent in transport and communication facilities
(Russian statistical yearbook, 2009). In some Russian fed-
eral regions, both indicators are even higher than 60 percent
(Regions of Russia, 2009).
The manifestation of the technical, social, and economic
factors mentioned above not only leads to accidents, rup-
tures, and crashes directly, but also increases a vulnerability
of the technosphere to natural impacts resulting in the sever-
ity and likelihood increasing of accidents (Petrova, 2006,
2009). The technosphere in the RF is exposed to the inﬂu-
ence of more than 30 different types of disaster-causing natu-
ral hazards (Kurbatova et al., 1997; Petrova and Shnyparkov,
2004). The most destructive of these are hurricanes and
storm winds, rainfall and snowfall, ﬂoods, earthquakes, land-
slides, geocryological processes, karsts, debris ﬂows, snow
avalanches, temperature extremes, and ground subsidence.
These hazardous natural processes and phenomena not only
produce a variety of natural disasters by themselves. Caus-
ing mechanical impacts on the infrastructure, industrial and
other facilities, they thus become triggers for various natural-
technological accidents (Petrova, 2005). In some cases, nat-
ural factors play a leading role in magnifying or triggering
technological accidents.
The analysis of the data base revealed a proportion of acci-
dentsinducedbynaturaleventsinthetotalnumberoftechno-
logical accidents and disasters registered. It comes to about
10 percent; among some types of technological accidents
this proportion is even higher. Thus, in 1991–2010, natural
hazards and disasters triggered more than 70 percent of all
so-called “blackouts” (accidental losses of electric power or
power outages) in the RF, about 30 percent of breakdowns in
water- and 18 percent in heat supply systems, about 30 per-
cent of collapses of buildings or other constructions, and
17 percent of water transport accidents. They also caused
about nine percent of pipeline ruptures, about ﬁve percent of
accidents with oil release, about four percent of railway ac-
cidents, and about three percent of aircraft and car crashes,
as well as other accidents with contaminant releases. The
contribution of different natural hazards to the occurrence of
various types of NTAs was also evaluated using information
collected (Table 1). Most of them were triggered by haz-
ardous hydrometeorological and related events. Criteria of
hazardous weather events in Russia are listed in Table 2. In
1991–2010, 38 percent of all NTAs were induced by wind-
storms and hurricanes, 20 percent – by snowfalls, snowdrifts,
and snowstorms, another 20 percent by rainfall and ﬂoods,
10 percent by hard frost and icing, 7 percent by landslides,
karsts, rockfall, subsidence of ground and other slope pro-
cesses, and more than 4 percent by thunderstorms and light-
ning.
Digital maps presenting regional distribution of NTAs
caused by various groups of natural hazards in 1991–2010
were created at the level of the Russian federal regions. One
example of this trigger mapping represents a cartogram in
Fig. 2. It demonstrates differences between federal regions in
the average annual number of accidents triggered by strong
winds and hurricanes. They happen more often in the Far
East of Russia as well as in some federal regions of the north-
western, southern, and central parts of the European Russia
that are exposed to these hazards most of all.
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Digital maps presenting regional distribution of NTA, which were caused by various 
groups of natural hazards in 1991-2010, were created at the level of Russian federal regions. One 
example of this triggers’ mapping represents a cartogram  on the  Fig. 2. It demonstrates 
differences between federal regions in average annual number of accidents triggered by strong 
winds and hurricanes. They happen more often in the Far East of Russia as well as in some 
federal regions of the north-western, southern, and central parts of the European Russia that are 
exposed to these hazards most of all.
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Fig. 4.  Frequency of “blackouts” triggered by natural hazards (average annual number of 
events): 1 – less than 0.1; 2 – 0.1-0.3; 3 – 0.4-0.6; 4 – 0.7-0.9; 5 – 1 and more
A part of every NTA type in the total number of NTA was estimated then (Fig. 3). The 
most frequent of NTA are breakdowns in electric power supply systems leading to “blackouts”; 
their proportion of all NTA listed in the data base exceeds 55 percent. The “blackouts” are 
mainly caused by broken wires (including abruption of wires by falling trees) and transmission 
tower collapses due to strong winds, cyclones, and hurricanes; snowstorms; deposition of ice, 
sleet, and snow; rainfalls, floods, and hailstones. Among other triggers of these accidents 
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Fig. 4. Frequency of “blackouts” triggered by natural hazards (average annual number of events): 1 – less than 0.1; 2 – 0.1–0.3; 3 – 0.4–0.6;
4 – 0.7–0.9; 5 – 1 and more.
Table 2. Criteria for hazardous weather events in Russia (according to the Hydrometeorological Centre of Russia).
Events
Criteria
by intensity by duration
Strong winds including squall (max.speed, in gusts)
– on the sea coasts and in mountainous areas;
– in other areas
≥35msec−1
≥25msec−1
any
any
Very heavy rain (rain and snow, sleet) ≥50mm ≤12h
Downpour (very heavy shower) ≥30mm ≤1h
Prolonged heavy rain ≥100mm ≥12h ≤48h
Very heavy snow ≥20mm ≤12h
Large hail ≥20mm any
Severe snowstorm (including blowing snow)
predominant average wind speed
visibility
≥15msec−1
≤500m
≥12h
Strong deposition (diameter) of
– ice
– rime
– wet snow sticking
≥20mm
≥50mm
≥35mm
any
any
any
Thick fog - visibility ≤50m ≥12h
A part of every NTA type in the total number of NTAs was
estimated then (Fig. 3). The most frequent NTAs are break-
downs in electric power supply systems leading to “black-
outs”; their proportion of all NTAs listed in the data base ex-
ceeds 55 percent. The “blackouts” are mainly caused by bro-
ken wires (including abruption of wires by falling trees) and
transmission tower collapses due to strong winds, cyclones,
and hurricanes; snowstorms; deposition of ice, sleet, and
snow; rainfall, ﬂoods, and hailstones. Among other trig-
gers of these accidents, earthquakes, hard frost, ﬁerce heat,
thunderstorms, landslides, snow avalanches, and debris ﬂows
should be mentioned. A great part of transmission facilities
in Russia uses overhead lines (more than 90 percent); this sit-
uation makes them especially vulnerable to natural impacts,
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earthquakes, hard frost, fierce heat, thunderstorms, landslides, snow avalanches, and debris flows 
should be mentioned. The great part of transmission facilities in Russia falls on overhead lines 
(more than 90 percent); this situation makes them especially vulnerable to natural impacts taking 
into account a large length of power lines (more than 2.6 million km) (Russian statistical 
yearbook, 2009). Breakdowns in electric power supply systems due to natural factors occur more 
often in the Far East, in Krasnodarskii Territory (south of Russia), in the north-western part of 
the European Russia, and in some regions of the Central Russia (Fig. 4), which are particularly 
prone to hurricanes, cyclones, snowstorms, and heavy rainfalls accompanying by hailstones, 
icing, and sleet. Thus, adverse weather phenomena (such as heavy snowfall that caused 
deposition of ice and snow on the wires) led to wire breakages and “blackouts” in six federal 
regions of the Central Russia in late December 2010. A total of about 445,000 people were 
affected by power outages (Summary of emergencies, 2010). In some cases power outages, in 
their turn, can cause a chain of other accidents such as failures at heat- and water supply, 
industrial plants, and transport facilities producing so-called “domino effect”.
About 10 percent of all NTA registered in the data base comprise accidents at heat supply 
systems (in some cases, combined with failures of power supply) caused by hard frost (Far East, 
Siberia, North-West, and Ural), strong winds (Far East and Krasnodarskii Territories), snowfalls 
and snowstorms (Far East, north-western, central, and southern parts of the European Russia), 
and landslides (central, and southern parts of the European Russia). The location of events 
recorded is shown on the Fig. 5. In general, failures of heat supply systems occur most often in 
Sakha (Yakutia) Republic and in some federal regions of the Russian Far East.
Fig. 5. Frequency of breakdowns in heat supply systems (average annual number of events): 1 – 
less than 0.1; 2 – 0.1-0.3; 3 – 0.4-0.6; 4 – 0.7-0.9; 5 – 1 and more; 6 – hard frost, 7 – landslide; 8 
– snow; 9 – strong wind
Accidents with oil and other contaminant releases triggered by natural hazards, which are 
usually considered as Natechs, comes to about 8 percent of  all NTA registered. They have 
especially severe consequences for the environment. The most part of oil releases in the RF is 
caused by pipeline ruptures that were induced in 1991-2010 by landslides, subsidence of ground, 
frost heaving and other geocryological processes, earthquakes, heavy rainfalls and floods, 
windstorms, and snow loads. In May 1995, Neftegorsk earthquake caused about 200 oil pipeline 
ruptures with tens of thousands of tons of oil spill in the north part of Sakhalin Island. It was the 
greatest disaster registered in the data base. The oil storages are more vulnerable to the impact of 
floods, landslides, earthquakes, and lightning. In May 2001 catastrophic flood destroyed 
6
Fig. 5. Frequency of breakdowns in heat supply systems (average annual number of events): 1 – less than 0.1; 2 – 0.1–0.3; 3 – 0.4–0.6; 4 –
0.7–0.9; 5 – 1 and more; 6 – hard frost, 7 – landslide; 8 – snow; 9 – strong wind.
taking into account the large length of power lines (more than
2.6millionkm) (Russian statistical yearbook, 2009). Break-
downs in electric power supply systems due to natural fac-
tors occur more often in the Far East, in the Krasnodarskii
Territory (south of Russia), in the northwestern part of Euro-
pean Russia, and in some regions of Central Russia (Fig. 4),
which are particularly prone to hurricanes, cyclones, snow-
storms, and heavy rainfall accompanied by hailstones, icing,
and sleet. Thus, adverse weather phenomena (such as heavy
snowfall that caused deposition of ice and snow on the wires)
led to wire breakages and “blackouts” in six federal regions
of the Central Russia in late December 2010. A total of about
445000 people were affected by power outages (Summary
of emergencies, 2010). In some cases power outages, in their
turn, can cause a chain of other accidents such as failures of
heat- and water supply, industrial plants, and transport facil-
ities producing the so-called “domino effect”.
About 10 percent of all NTA registered in the data base
comprise accidents at heat supply systems (in some cases,
combined with failures of power supply) caused by hard
frost (Far East, Siberia, North-West, and Ural), strong winds
(FarEastandKrasnodarskiiTerritories), snowfallsandsnow-
storms (Far East, north-western, central, and southern parts
of the European Russia), and landslides (central, and south-
ern parts of the European Russia). The location of events
recorded is shown on the Fig. 5. In general, failures of heat
supplysystemsoccurmostofteninSakha(Yakutia)Republic
and in some federal regions of the Russian Far East.
Accidents with oil and other contaminant releases trig-
gered by natural hazards, which are usually considered as
Natechs, come to about 8 percent of all NTAs registered.
They have especially severe consequences for the environ-
ment. For the most part, oil releases in the RF are caused by
pipeline ruptures that were induced in 1991–2010 by land-
slides, subsidence of ground, frost heaving and other geocry-
ological processes, earthquakes, heavy rainfall and ﬂoods,
windstorms, and snow loads. In May 1995, the Neftegorsk
earthquake caused about 200 oil pipeline ruptures with tens
of thousands of tons of oil spill in the north part of Sakhalin
Island. It was the greatest disaster registered in the data base.
The oil storages are more vulnerable to the impact of ﬂoods,
landslides, earthquakes, and lightning. In May 2001 a catas-
trophic ﬂood destroyed a petroleum storage depot in Lensk,
in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). More than 12 thou-
sand tons of petroleum products ﬂowed into the waters of
the River Lena (Vorobyev et al., 2005).
AsregardsotherNTAtypes(Fig.3, Table1), thefollowing
groups of natural hazards act as prevailing triggers of them:
– windstorms, snowfall, rainfall, hard frost, subsidence of
ground, and other slope processes, or ﬂoods as triggers
of sudden collapse of buildings or other constructions;
– hard frost, rainfall, landslides, or subsidence of ground
as triggers of breakdowns in water supply systems;
– snowfall and snowstorms, icy conditions of roads, rain-
fall, fogs, mist, or snow avalanches as triggers of car
crashes;
– storms, cyclones, typhoons, or fogs as triggers of water
transport accidents (shipwrecks);
– snowdrifts and snowstorms, heavy rainfall and ﬂoods,
landslides, snow avalanches, ﬁerce heat, or rockfalls as
triggers of railway accidents;
– windstorms, snowfall, icing, or fogs as triggers of air-
craft crashes;
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petroleum storage depot in Lensk, in Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). More than 12 thousand tons 
of petroleum products flowed into the waters of the River Lena (Vorobyev et al., 2005).
As regards other NTA types (Fig. 3, Table 1), the following groups of natural hazards act 
as prevailing triggers of them:
· windstorms, snowfalls, rainfalls, hard frost, subsidence of  ground, and other slope 
processes, or floods as triggers of sudden collapses of buildings or other constructions;
· hard frost, rainfalls, landslides, or subsidence of ground as triggers of breakdowns in 
water supply systems; 
· snowfalls and snowstorms, icy conditions of roads, rainfalls, fogs, mist, or  snow 
avalanches as triggers of car crashes; 
· storms, cyclones, typhoons, or fogs as triggers of water transport accidents (shipwrecks); 
· snowdrifts and snowstorms, heavy rainfalls and floods, landslides, snow avalanches, 
fierce heat, or rockfalls as triggers of railway accidents;
· windstorms, snowfalls, icing, or fogs as triggers of air crashes;
· lightning or heat as triggers of fires and explosions;
· endogenous gas flows and methane accumulation as triggers of explosions and fires in 
coal-mines.
Figure 6 shows the resulting map of NTA risk in the Russian Federation. The risk level 
was calculated by the total number of  events  triggered by all types of natural hazards and 
disasters in 1991-2010. The greatest risk of their occurrence is seen in Sakhalin Region (about 80 
events registered during the whole observation period) as well as in Primorskii (Far East) and 
Krasnodarskii Territories (south of the European Russia) (more than 50 events).
Fig. 6. Risk of NTA (calculated by the total number of events in 1991-2010): 1 – low (less than 
6); 2 – average (6-10); 3 – above average (11-15); 4 – high (16-20); 5 – very high (more than 20)
5 Discussion and perspectives
The data base of technological  accidents and disasters has been created. More than 13,000 
information  units have been collected and analyzed.  The data base is replenished; new 
information is constantly being added to it.
The   analysis   of   the  information   collected   permitted   examination   of   geographical 
distribution of technological accidents and disasters within Russian federal regions in 1991-
2010. The main triggers of accidents were revealed. In addition to technical, economic, and 
social causes, natural hazards and disasters also play an essential (sometimes a leading) role in 
triggering or magnifying technological accidents. About 10 percent of all accidents registered in 
7
Fig. 6. Risk of NTA (calculated by the total number of events in 1991–2010): 1 – low (less than 6); 2 – average (6–10); 3 – above average
(11–15); 4 – high (16–20); 5 – very high (more than 20).
– lightning or heat as triggers of ﬁres and explosions;
– endogenous gas ﬂows and methane accumulation as
triggers of explosions and ﬁres in coal-mines.
Figure 6 shows the resulting map of NTA risk in the Russian
Federation. The risk level was calculated by the total number
of events triggered by all types of natural hazards and disas-
ters in 1991–2010. The greatest risk of their occurrence is
seen in the Sakhalin Region (about 80 events registered dur-
ing the whole observation period) as well as in the Primorskii
(Far East) and Krasnodarskii Territories (south of the Euro-
pean Russia) (more than 50 events).
5 Discussion and perspectives
The data base of technological accidents and disasters has
been created. More than 13000 information units have been
collected and analyzed. The data base is replenished; new
information is constantly being added to it.
The analysis of the information collected permitted exami-
nationofgeographicaldistributionoftechnologicalaccidents
and disasters within Russian federal regions in 1991–2010.
The main triggers of accidents were revealed. In addition to
technical, economic, and social causes, natural hazards and
disasters also played an essential (sometimes a leading) role
in triggering or magnifying technological accidents. About
10 percent of all accidents registered in the data base were in-
duced by natural events; among some types of accidents this
proportion is even higher. Transmission facilities with more
than 90 percent of overhead lines are the most vulnerable to
the natural hazards impact. In 1991–2010, natural hazards
and disasters triggered more than 70 percent of all “black-
outs”. The part of this NTA type in the total number of NTA
was the largest one (more than 55 percent), too. Proportions
of other NTA types were also estimated.
A contribution of different natural hazards to the occur-
rence of various types of NTAs was assessed. Regions with
the greatest NTA risk were revealed for the RF. The inﬂuence
of natural events on the technosphere is stronger in the south-
ern part of the European Russia and in the Russian Far East,
which are more exposed to strong winds, hurricanes, snow-
fall and snowstorms, rainfall, icing, and other natural hazards
producing NTAs.
Most of the NTAs in the RF in 1991–2010 were caused
by natural processes related to various hydrometeorological
events and phenomena. It is to be expected that their inten-
sity and frequency may increase towards the end of the cen-
tury due to climate change. This may, in turn, increase the
severity and likelihood of NTAs. For example, the increase
in precipitation (especially in liquid form) in the cold season
and alternation of thaw periods and cold spells may cause
breakdowns of transmission facilities and other lines of com-
munication as well as increasing the number of collapses of
roofs and buildings and transport accidents. Potential per-
mafrost thawing will produce a risk of building collapses,
transmission and other facility failures, as well as roads, rail-
ways, andpipelinesdisruptioninpermafrostareasthatcomes
to 63 percent in the total area of Russia.
Critical infrastructure facilities, especially those located
in regions with the greatest NTA risk need a special protec-
tion and modernization. In particular, overhead power lines
should be, where possible, replaced by underground cables.
The pipelines, oil and other contaminant storages should be
designed and equipped not only for normal operating condi-
tions and “ordinary” technological accidents, but also to nat-
ural impacts that will be increasing. A monitoring of natural
hazards producing NTAs, as well as gathering and analysing
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of accidents information is very important for risk manage-
ment. Emergency planning and response should be prepared
for coping with multiple and simultaneous accidents, which
are typical for NTAs. The problem of relationship between
natural hazards and technosphere is very complicated and
needs further investigation, especially taking into consider-
ation the climate changes expected.
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